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This article explores the potential human rights impacts of the ‘extreme energy’ process,
speciﬁcally focussing on the production of shale gas, coal-bed methane (CBM) and
‘tight oil’, known colloquially as ‘fracking’. The article locates the discussion within
a broader context of resource depletion, the ‘limits to growth’ and the process of
extreme energy itself. Utilising recent secondary data from the United States and
Australia, combined with the preliminary ﬁndings of our ethnographic ﬁeldwork in
the United Kingdom, the article outlines a prima facie case for investigating
‘fracking’ development through a human rights lens. Indeed, based on considerable
emerging evidence we argue that ‘fracking’ development poses a signiﬁcant risk to a
range of key human rights and should thus form the subject of a multitude of
comprehensive, interdisciplinary human rights impact assessments (HRIAs) as a
matter of urgency. Finally, given the close relationships between government and
extractive industries, we argue that these impact assessments must do more than
bolster corporate social responsibility (CSR) statements and should be truly
independent of either government or industry inﬂuence.
Keywords: extreme energy; fracking; human rights; impact assessments; environment;
hydraulic fracturing; corporate social responsibility
Introduction
Limits to growth, extreme energy and the ‘minimally good life’
While the theory and practice of ‘human rights’ has produced many differing conceptions,
justiﬁcations, formulations and relativistic exceptions,1 for the purposes of this article we
will principally utilise the relatively uncontentious, empirically grounded, ‘minimalist’2
conception articulated by legal scholar James Nickel. For Nickel, contemporary human
rights standards are justiﬁed moral and legal claims ‘universally held’ by all persons vis-
à-vis their governments, coupled with their corresponding moral and legal duties that gov-
ernments, at all levels, owe their citizens in order for them to lead a ‘minimally good life’.3
National and international institutions bear the primary responsibility of securing human
rights and the test for successfully fulﬁlling this responsibility is the creation of opportu-
nities for all individuals to lead such a life. The realisation of human rights requires estab-
lishing the conditions, positive and negative, for all human beings to lead minimally good
lives and thus should not be confused with attempts to promote the highest possible stan-
dards of living, or the best or most just form of economic system, or a morally perfect
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society. The impression that many have of human rights as being unduly utopian testiﬁes
less to the inherent demands of human rights and more to the extent to which the fairly
modest aspiration of a ‘minimally good life’4 for all is so far from being realised in the
world today. Here, we are not just talking about the seemingly inﬁnite number of discrete
human rights violations around the world, about which much has been written, but also the
systemic denial of the ‘minimally good life’ for millions of people that seems to be the
inevitable by-product of the capitalist mode of production5 and about which much less
has been written. Perhaps the most well-known debate in the human rights literature is
the exchange between Rhoda Howard-Hassman and Admandiata Pollis. The debate high-
lighted contrasting interpretations of the pros and cons of the spread of global capitalism for
human rights, but it is the former’s6 faith in capitalism’s ‘long term’ prospects for the
enhancement of human rights that is symptomatic of a distinct academic and popular
denial of the two most important and unsavoury facts facing humanity today – the
‘limits to growth’ and anthropogenic climate change.
The 1972 Club of Rome report The Limits to Growth7 utilised a system dynamics
computer model to simulate the interactions of ﬁve global economic subsystems,
namely: population, food production, industrial production, pollution and consumption
of non-renewable natural resources, the results of which posed serious challenges for
global sustainability. A recent study collated historical data for 1970–20008 and compared
them with scenarios presented in The Limits to Growth. The analysis shows that 30 years of
historical data compares favourably with key features of the ‘standard run’ scenario, which
results in collapse of the global system midway through the twenty-ﬁrst century. The key
driver behind the Limits to Growth prediction – and arguably the one most poised to
quickly cause global economic collapse – is the depletion of non-renewable energy
sources, especially of oil and natural gas.9 Despite the best efforts of the fossil fuel industry
to propagate a paradigm of energy abundance, especially in the United States (US),10 global
production of conventional oil has already peaked and – barring incredibly unlikely huge
new discoveries of easily extracted oil – must soon decline as predicted in Limits to
Growth.11 New discoveries of oil and natural gas liquids12 have dropped dramatically
since their peak in the 1960s, and the world now consumes four to ﬁve barrels of oil for
every one discovered.13 Because oil production from conventional ﬁelds drops globally
by 5% each year, it is thus assured that such ﬁelds will eventually ‘run out’.14
This downward global trend in oil discovery and supply has not gone unnoticed by the
major international actors, namely states and multi- and trans-national corporations, who
have taken various actions since the end of the Cold War to secure access to remaining con-
ventional oil supplies. An examination of major international conﬂicts in the Persian Gulf
region alone since 1990 demonstrates the determination of countries such as the US to
maintain control of conventional energy resources.15 Indeed, conventional energy supplies
have become so precious to many states that ‘energy security’16 is now an overriding objec-
tive within which foreign and domestic policies situate the procurement of oil (and other
energy sources) as a matter of national security. Such a discourse often elevates concern
for the global fossil fuel market over other considerations such as the environment and
human rights.17
This change in rhetoric to boost the perceived necessity of fossil fuels is furthered by the
inﬂuence of major energy corporations upon state governments. As numerous internation-
ally reaching corporations, such as Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips, have developed
larger economies than many sizeable states,18 their power has correspondingly grown.
Since such companies’ business models centre on fossil fuels, examples of corporate-state
collaboration to further non-renewable energy use may be found in varying arenas, from
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the more than 50 million dollars Koch Industries spent on lobbying the US government
between 1998 and 201019 and the formation of the American Legislative Exchange
Council (which brings private corporations together with elected US state ofﬁcials to
draft new legislation),20 to direct connections between advisors to the United Kingdom
(UK) Cabinet Ofﬁce and energy sector companies such as Centrica and Riverstone.21
Because of the overly close, arguably corrupt and undemocratic relationships,22 between
politicians and corporate interests, it could be argued that the exclusion of ‘the underground
injection of natural gas for purposes of storage’ and ‘ … of ﬂuids or propping agents… pur-
suant to hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activi-
ties’ from the US Safe Drinking Water Act23; the British government’s determination to
make unconventional energy extraction through hydraulic fracturing an ‘urgent national pri-
ority’24; the failure of the European Union to create legally binding environmental legis-
lation for hydraulic fracturing25; and George W. Bush’s administration’s policy of
attempting to ‘refute the science of global warming and install in its place economic and
environmental policies that not only ignore but deny the views of the scientiﬁc community
on climate change’26 are – at the very least in part – results of the wishes of the energy sector.
As the 200 largest listed fossil fuel companies spent $674 billion on developing new energy
reserves (ﬁve times as much as they spent returning money to shareholders) in 2012,27 the
energy industry remains invested in pushing the ‘limits’ as far as they can go.28
Though corporations may lobby otherwise,29 resource limitations to growth are not the
only signiﬁcant, impending, ecological threats to human rights on a global scale. Carbon
dioxide atmospheric concentrations ‘have increased by 40% since pre-industrial times’,
with concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide at the highest in at
least 800,000 years,30 and the rate of carbon dioxide release is unprecedented, at least in
the last 300 million years. The result of this level of pollution – inherently tied to an insis-
tence on using and depleting non-renewable energy sources31 – is the phenomenon of
climate change, in this context represented by the anthropogenic increase in the earth’s
surface temperature. Since 1880, the average global temperature has increased by
roughly 0.85 degrees Celsius, with most of the increase – 0.72 degrees Celsius – occurring
in the past 50 years.32 The effects of this global warming are diverse and range from shrink-
ing glaciers and ice sheets, to the highest rate of sea level rise in the past 2000 years and
increasingly frequent extreme weather events; all of which clearly result from ‘human inﬂu-
ence on the climate system’.33
Knowing that these two results of humanity’s ‘addiction’ to fossil fuels are imminently
approaching, it may be hoped that global use of oil, natural gas and coal are immediately
curbed. At present, however, fossil fuels still remain the world’s main source of energy,
accounting for 81% of global primary energy use in 2010.34 This is undoubtedly due, at
least in part, to the current, Western propagated, largely fossil fuel dependent, neoliberal
economic model, wherein corporations, being legally bound to pursue proﬁt above all
other considerations, continuously, and most often successfully, lobby for favourable legis-
lation, deregulation and tax incentives. As Bakan noted in his seminal text, The Corpor-
ation: The Pathological Pursuit of Proﬁt and Power,35 under corporate law, the primary
legal duty of the corporation is ‘simply to make money for shareholders’ and failing to
pursue this end ‘can leave directors and ofﬁcers open to being sued.36 Thus, the multitude
of multi-billion dollar companies that depend upon the continued global use of fossil fuels
have not only a vested interest in advocating for further non-renewable energy extraction,
but arguably, in the current energy market, a legal duty to do so – and at the very least an
obligation to continue pursuing oil, coal and natural gas extraction as long as it is proﬁtable
(and legal) to do so. Thus, while the use of renewable energy sources is growing,37 they are
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forced to compete with an established and highly subsidised38 non-renewable market,
rather than be allowed to replace it.39
Furthermore, as conventional reserves are depleted40 and demand for energy rises, there
is increasing pressure to exploit unconventional energy sources.41 Michael Klare42 ﬁrst
coined the term ‘extreme energy’ to describe a range of relatively new, higher-risk,
non-renewable resource extraction processes that have become more attractive to the con-
ventional energy industry as the more easily accessible supplies dwindle. Edward Lloyd-
Davies points out, however, that this deﬁnition of extreme energy as a category is highly
problematic as it is dependent upon speciﬁc examples; it lacks ‘explanatory or predictive
power’,43 and leaves open the question of who decides which extractive techniques
qualify. A conceptual understanding would suggest that extreme energy is a ‘process
whereby extraction methods grow more intense over time, as easier to extract resources
are depleted’. The foundation of this conception is the simple fact that those energy
sources which require the least amount of effort to extract will be used ﬁrst, and only
once those are dwindling will more effort be exerted to gain similar resources. Extreme
energy, in this sense, is evident in the history of energy extraction – in the change from gath-
ering ‘sea coal’ from British beaches and exploiting ‘natural oil seeps’, to opencast mining
and deep-water oil drilling. Viewed in this light, the concept of extreme energy becomes a
lens through which current energy extraction efforts can be explained and the future of the
energy industry predicted. Using this extreme energy lens necessitates an understanding of
‘the amount of energy which is needed to obtain energy’, as in this process it is that value
which is continually rising. This value may be calculated as either ‘net energy’ or ‘energy
return on investment’ (EROI), whereby net energy is the available energy for use after sub-
tracting the energy required for extraction, and EROI is the percentage of energy produced
divided by the amount required for extraction. When charted together, the net energy avail-
able to society is seen to decrease along with EROI in a curved mathematical relationship
which forms the ‘energy cliff’ – i.e. the point at which EROI becomes increasingly low and
net energy drops to zero.44
In the extreme energy process the economic system can be conceptualised as consisting
of two distinct segments, the part which is extracting, reﬁning and producing energy (the
energy industry) and everything else, which just consumes energy. What needs to be
clearly understood is that the energy industry is in the rare position where the commodity
which it produces is also the main resource it consumes. Therefore, as energy extraction
becomes more extreme, while the rest of the economy will be squeezed by decreasing
energy availability and rising prices,45 the energy industry’s rising costs will be offset by
the rising revenues it receives. The net result will be a reallocation (through the market
or otherwise) of resources from the rest of society to the energy industry, to allow the
energy industry to target ever more difﬁcult to extract resources. This process is ongoing
as easier-to-extract resources are depleted, and data from recent extraction methods, such
as hydraulic fracturing and tar sands extraction, show that industry is increasingly lurching
towards the net energy cliff. Such action on the part of some of the largest and most com-
mercially successful trans-national corporations may only be understood as the logical
result of the extreme energy process46 – there simply are not enough easier-to-extract
resources available.47
Despite the obvious negative implications of these developments, the process shows no
sign of stopping, but continues towards the precipice at an ever-increasing rate, fuelled by
ever-increasing levels of energy consumption. Perpetuated by the global economic ‘growth’
ﬁxation,48 increasing amounts of energy are consumed each year,49 driving the process over
the edge. Of course, industry is not willing to halt the process50 as intense demand further
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pushes up the price of energy,51 allowing extraction to remain economical – as long as
enough resource is extracted at each site and the price stays high. The result is that
higher energy consumption leads to faster resource depletion, which in turn results in the
acceleration of the extreme energy process. Within this neoliberal economic context of
increasing demand and proﬁt potential the results of extreme extraction techniques,52 and
the consequences of continuing the process, are easily trumped in the interest of short-
term proﬁteering and ‘energy security’. Indeed, as Stephanie Malin notes, neoliberal
‘normalization’ of unconventional energy extraction emerges most saliently regarding
environmental outcomes and economic development.53 Despite the prospective conse-
quences of reaching our limits to growth, and with considerable evidence demonstrating
a strong correlation between extraction effort and damage to both society and the environ-
ment, the extreme energy process continues to accelerate with potentially disastrous
consequences.54
The depth of connections already established between the extreme energy process and
the ‘minimally good life’ illustrates the otherwise overlooked insidious nature of this insis-
tence upon striving towards the energy precipice. Human rights violations due to climate
change and the release of pollutants are yet another side effect of humanity’s dependence
on fossil fuels that grows in magnitude with each decade. The tropics and subtropics
have seen droughts increase in intensity and duration since the 1970s,55 and diseases
such as malaria are affecting larger portions of the population.56 Two hundred thousand
deaths in the US each year result from air pollution,57 while a heat wave across Europe
in 2003 (most likely resulting from global climate change)58 left roughly 30,000 people
dead.59 There is strong evidence to suggest that the worst consequences of anthropogenic
climate change on human rights have not yet been felt. As predicted in The Limits to
Growth.60 the effects of climate degradation will rapidly increase with temperature through-
out the twenty-ﬁrst century,61 resulting in large-scale deaths across Europe due to heat
stroke,62 worsening droughts across continents,63 further loss of food and water, and a
potential, eventual, extinction-level event for humanity if global emissions are not
reduced in accordance with the latest climate science modelling. Such events, along with
resulting unrest, wars and mass migrations,64 threaten people’s rights to life and health
worldwide.
The rush to scrape the bottom of the fossil fuel barrel is thus creating a veritable perfect
storm for current and future human rights abuses. As resources become scarcer our scram-
ble to use them grows, increasing the political prioritisation of fossil fuel extraction over
ecosystems, human health and security; while increasing demand also ensures that such
resources will run out sooner, which in turn will result in further human rights violations
as food, health care and other basic needs are no longer met, to say nothing of the
abuses to human security which would also necessarily increase. These violations will
most likely increase exponentially as resources are depleted – at least, that is, until the
sharp population decline predicted in The Limits to Growth occurs.65
‘Fracking’ as the latest step in the process
In addition to the infamous ‘tar sands’66 in Alberta Canada, the march towards the net
energy cliff is arguably spearheaded in the West by the most recently developed family
of extreme energy extraction methods known as ‘fracking’, a colloquial expression
which usually refers to the extraction of shale gas, CBM (coal-bed methane) and ‘tight
oil’. The term, however, has become somewhat loaded, such that it is necessary to
outline the contrasting uses and deﬁne the senses in which it is invoked in this article. In
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public discourse about ‘fracking’ different sides often talk past each other, due to very
different understandings of what the issues are, and differing deﬁnitions of the term
itself. These differences fall along a spectrum that can be understood in terms of the inter-
ests of the parties involved.
Exploitation of unconventional oil and gas is a new, more extreme form of fossil fuel
extraction, targeting much less permeable rock formations than previous conventional oil
and gas extraction. It is characterised by the drilling of dense patterns of, usually horizontal,
wells (up to eight per square mile or more) in conjunction with other more intense processes
such as hydraulic fracturing and de-watering. Different rock formations can be targeted,
such as shale (shale gas and oil) and coal (CBM), but the negative impacts on the environ-
ment and society are very similar. For many local people affected, ‘fracking’ has come to
mean petroleum extraction companies turning up where they live and coating the area in
hundreds or thousands of well-pads, compressor stations and pipelines alongside large
volumes of truck trafﬁc with some likening it to an ‘invasion’ and ‘occupation’,67 bringing
with it a large variety of negative consequences for them and their environment.
The word ‘fracking’, however, is derived from ‘fraccing’, a much more narrowly
deﬁned industry slang for ‘hydraulic fracturing’, one particular stage of unconventional pet-
roleum (oil or gas) extraction. A scaled-up form of hydraulic fracturing (high volume),
involving injecting ﬂuids under high pressure to crack the rock, is often used to release
hydrocarbons during unconventional oil and gas extraction. The communities living with
the consequences of unconventional oil and gas extraction are mainly concerned with the
impact it has on them and their environment. Unconventional oil and gas extraction is a
complex process, involving pad construction, well drilling, casing, stimulation (often
including but not limited to hydraulic fracturing), extraction and transport, along with
well plugging and abandonment (or failure to do so). All these stages have a consequent
impact on their local environment and, due to the fact that fracking requires so many
more wells covering much larger areas, these impacts mount up to a far greater extent
than for conventional extraction and production.
In an era of peaked conventional supplies,68 extractive industries are principally con-
cerned with ﬁnding new fossil fuels to extract in order to ensure continued proﬁts, the
cumulative impacts of which are likely to be seen as little more than simple ‘externalities’
for the companies involved. Focused as they are on getting gas and oil out of the ground,
regardless, the industry and their government supporters are concerned to utilise the tech-
nologies for just that. Moreover, they work on a drilling site by drilling site basis, and the
cumulative impact of the whole process seems to be of little concern. It is also useful in their
public relations to focus on micro details rather than the macro picture, and a narrow deﬁ-
nition of ‘fracking’, as simply hydraulic fracturing, helps promote the impression that frack-
ing is simply conventional extraction plus hydraulic fracturing, rather than an entirely
different process with very different impacts. Quite possibly one of the reasons the term
‘fracking’ has become synonymous with unconventional oil and gas extraction more gen-
erally lies in the choices made by the industry in their early promotional pitches to investors.
Indeed, in the early part of the last decade, it seems that to raise funds for exploration a
simple technological explanation was preferred when pitching to non-experts. The industry
chose to focus attention on hydraulic fracturing as the key ingredient out of a complex array
of technological processes. It is not difﬁcult to understand why the idea of a new, high-tech
well completion method, ‘massive slick-water hydraulic fracturing’, which was going to
single-handedly revolutionise the industry by allowing access to a wealth of previously
untapped resources, was an attractive sales pitch to investors. A more accurate view of
unconventional oil and gas, as requiring much more effort, drilling greater numbers of
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much more expensive wells in order to produce much less oil/gas, does not sound like such
an attractive proposition in comparison. It is therefore unsurprising that the terminology
used to describe the industry (and the understanding of the issues involved) has become
somewhat skewed by this initial spin.
Given that this article deals with the impact of unconventional extraction on people and
the environment from a human rights perspective, the issues raised are the wider ones sur-
rounding the overall effects of the entire more-intense extraction process, rather than ones
speciﬁc to particular technologies the industry may or may not use. For this reason it is far
more appropriate to use this wider deﬁnition of ‘fracking’, rather than the more narrowly
deﬁned industry slang that has the effect of limiting discourse to just the narrow technical
process of hydraulic fracturing itself, as if it could occur in an isolated vacuum without its
necessary production infrastructure. Even so, it should still be acknowledged that since
there are often signiﬁcant levels of confusion surrounding the use of the term, the particular
understanding being used should always be deﬁned. Thus, to be clear, in this article ‘frack-
ing’ is being used in its wider sense to include all of the required industrial elements of
hydraulic fracturing, from huge quantities of water, to compressor stations, truck trafﬁc
and waste disposal.
In the countries where ‘fracking’ development has taken place it has been controversial
and divisive. Supporters of unconventional gas development often claim that it reduces gas
prices, creates employment opportunities and provides ‘energy security’, all the while pro-
ducing lower carbon emissions than coal. Its detractors often contest all such claims, usually
pointing to contrary data emerging from the US and Australia. Indeed, in numerous studies
from both countries, local communities most affected by developments often cite consider-
able negative impacts on the environment and human health, including groundwater con-
tamination, air pollution, radioactive and toxic waste, water usage, earthquakes, methane
migration and the industrialisation of rural landscapes,69 the cumulative effect of which
has led to calls for the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC)70 to condemn fracking
as a threat to basic human rights, particularly the rights to water and health. Fracking devel-
opment is fast becoming a human rights issue.71
A need for human rights impact assessments
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has issued a ‘Global Alert’72 on the
issue of fracking development, warning of signiﬁcant environmental risks to the air, soil and
water (contamination and usage competition); ecosystem damage; habitat and biodiversity
impacts; and fugitive gas emissions – which will endanger carbon reduction targets. In
terms of public health, UNEP73 warned of risks of pipeline explosions; release of toxins
into air, soil and water; and competition for land and water resources needed for food pro-
duction and that unconventional gas would likely be used ‘in addition to coal rather than
being a substitute’74 and would thus pose a threat to the development of sustainable
economies.
Most of the academic papers on the impacts of fracking have focused on such issues as
the macroeconomic beneﬁts of a ‘shale gas revolution’, the ‘green’ credentials of shale
gas,75 and the levels of environmental impact and responsibility for it.76 The few human
impact investigations undertaken have come from investigative journalists,77 small non-
governmental organisations (NGOs)78 and documentary ﬁlmmakers.79 While valuable,
such studies have been limited in scope and were not comparative. Recently anthropologists
and sociologists have started to document the social and political discourses of fracking and
the surrounding social conﬂicts in discreet Australian communities80 and perceptions of
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risk and opportunity in American communities,81 but they predominantly engage in dis-
course and perception analysis rather than invoking an impact-based analysis. A recent
sociological study of the UK context takes a similar discourse analysis approach, albeit
at an earlier stage of development, i.e. the exploration stage.82 Though such studies high-
light the relevant priorities – and possible weaknesses – of arguments for and against frack-
ing, they do not utilise an interdisciplinary approach that would engage with scientiﬁc
ﬁndings that speak to an empirical reality beyond individuals’ ‘perceptions’, nor do they
systematically interrogate how individual perceptions and behaviours are affected by
wider social structures and institutionalised power.
Taking a broader, more structurally aware approach, a recent study has shown that ‘neo-
liberal logic’ has led stakeholders to self-regulate their behaviour in order to facilitate frack-
ing, by seeing its current role in rural industrialisation, its potential environmental and
health outcomes, and its economic outcomes as part of a ‘new normal’.83 The consequences
of this normalisation of loss of agency therefore raises fundamental questions about the
ability of communities to resist extractive operations and make informed choices about
the sources of their energy. Green criminologists have also called for a more theoretically
robust approach to the study of ecological harms and crimes.84 A recent study by Shelley
and Opsal85 of the social and ecological impacts of energy extractive practices on local
communities implies that green criminologists are starting to investigate this issue, docu-
menting not only illegal actions but also processes and outcomes that are ‘harmful’ to
humans, animals and the environment. In a recent paper de Rijke noted:
the extraordinary expansion of the unconventional gas industry has… led to questions about
social power and the rights of individuals and local communities, the role of multinational cor-
porations in politics and rural service provision, as well as related questions regarding funda-
mental processes of democracy, capitalist economies and social justice86
while the
close relationship between governments and powerful multinational corporations brings to the
fore questions about political inﬂuence and human rights.87
Thus, to address these ‘important conundrums’, de Rijke advocated further academic
research into fracking from multiple perspectives, including social impact assessments.
Given the weight of evidence of human impacts that is emerging from countries with a
mature fracking industry, such as the US and Australia, we suggest it is time to meet de
Rijke’s call through the human rights lens, i.e. the creation of comprehensive interdisciplin-
ary human rights impact assessments (HRIAs) of fracking.
The last ten years has seen a growth in HRIAs that have been developed by a variety of
actors as an extension of, or improvement on, social impact assessments (SIAs), which in
turn developed from environmental impact assessments (EIAs). Recent academic literature
on HRIAs88 has identiﬁed a number of distinct advantages of such assessments over
broader SIAs. With recent UN-based developments regarding the human rights due dili-
gence obligations for companies,89 particularly in the extractive industries, the HRIA meth-
odology is valuable because it uses a set of norms and standards that are based on shared
values and, therefore, represents a solid normative foundation on which to base impact
assessments.90 Second, human rights represent legal obligations of states, rather than
simply aspirations, and so HRIAs may compel duty-bearers to act to protect the rights of
rights-holders.91 Third, HRIAs require a disaggregation of impacts to ensure that the
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effects on vulnerable groups are identiﬁed, such as women, children and indigenous groups.
The human rights approach also encourages respect for stakeholder rights to information,
participation, transparency and accountability92 and a commitment to ‘improving the
quality of life of people and communities’93 and a desire to inﬂuence policy and practice
to that end. The methodological focus of a HRIA is an evidence-based evaluation of com-
mitments made by a state and the actual ability of individuals, groups and communities in a
country to enjoy these rights. HRIAs provide (intergovernmental) organisations, govern-
ments and companies with instruments to better focus their human rights efforts; and
civil society, community activists and NGOs can use them as an analytical and lobbying
tool. A HRIA can be done before the activity takes place (ex ante), or after the activity
has taken place (ex post).
What is missing, both from academia and the world of public policy are impartial inter-
disciplinary human rights-based investigations of a range of effects, impacts and changes
brought on by fracking projects and experienced by individuals, families and communities
in countries with a developed industry, such as Australia and the US, so as to better under-
stand actual and potential human rights impacts for future affected communities in those
countries and in countries at pre-production stages. At the same time research must
include data collected from sites with different levels of industry maturity as evidence
from the US has shown that support for fracking reduces with experience of cumulative
impacts.94 It is vital that this research commences forthwith since many countries currently
at various exploration stages (e.g. the UK, Poland, Romania, Botswana, South Africa and
Argentina) are seeking to move to full production within the next ﬁve years and production
is already beginning in some countries (e.g. China, India and Indonesia), while established
producers will seek to expand when, and where, possible. This is all taking place without
adequate research on the social and human rights impacts of such development and how
these relate to the environmental impacts. Indeed, the next ﬁve years represent a crucial
window of opportunity for stakeholder communities, civil society organisations and
NGOs to meaningfully engage with those proposing fracking development; impartial, com-
munity-based HRIAs will greatly aid this endeavour.
In the balance of this article we demonstrate that there are at least ten areas of concern
that would provide key ‘indicator’ data for such assessments due to their inherent connec-
tion with the fracking process and its social and political context. These areas are: water, air,
land, health, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of expression, liberty and security of
the person, right to a fair trial, right to respect for the private and family life, and anthropo-
genic climate change.
Many of the negative effects of fracking have revolved around these key issues, each of
which has a legal basis in human rights and an obvious connection to Nickel’s ‘minimally
good life’. Thus, an examination of each topic is essential to making the prima facie case for
assessing fracking’s human rights impacts in an interdisciplinary manner that goes beyond
existing ‘perception’ studies to include additional empirical data, often from scientiﬁc
sources.
Water
One of the most contentious and widely publicised environmental, and we would argue
human rights, issues connected with fracking is the water impact: groundwater contami-
nation, water use and contaminated water waste disposal. Shale gas production is a
highly water-intensive process, with a typical single well requiring around ﬁve million
gallons of water, and an average well-pad cluster up to 60 million gallons, to drill and
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fracture, depending on the basin and geological formation.95 The vast majority of this water
is used during the fracturing process, with large volumes of water pumped into the well with
sand and chemicals to facilitate the extraction of the gas; the remainder is used in the drilling
stage, with water being the major component of the drilling ﬂuids. Once that water is used
by the industry it is no longer a useful resource for society. While increasing quantities of
water are being recycled and reused in the US, freshwater is still used in large quantities for
the drilling operations as ‘produced’ water is more likely to damage the equipment and
reduce the chance of a ‘successful well’. The industry’s requirements96 for such quantities
of freshwater are clearly a serious concern in water-scarce regions of the world and in places
with high cumulative demand for water.
In the case of CBM extraction the major water use is the dewatering of the coal seams,
in order to allow the gas to ﬂow. This involves pumping large quantities (hundreds of thou-
sands of litres per day) of water out of each well. The overall effect of pumping out such
large amounts of water, when multiplied by potentially thousands of wells in any given
region, is usually to dramatically lower water tables in the area, since freshwater aquifers
nearer the surface tend to drain down into the coal seams when water is removed from
them. For instance, the Queensland Water Commission predicts a massive water table
drop of 700m in some areas due to CBM extraction.97 So while the mechanisms are
very different, the overall impacts of shale and CBM extraction on water availability are
just as serious. Such demand pressures are already being felt in areas of the US and Aus-
tralia, leading to pressure on water sources and competition for withdrawal permits.98
The large quantity of water used by the fracking industry is but one of many serious
concerns. The contamination of groundwater sources,99 from failure in the well casing
over time,100 what industry refers to as ‘zonal isolation’ failure, is a very serious issue
across regions that have seen considerable fracking development to date, and has duly fea-
tured as a central public relations battleground for industry and pro-fracking governments.
Even so, arguably the most concerning issue with fracking’s use of water is the issue of
produced/waste water treatment and disposal, often simply referred to as ‘waste water
management’. And yet, the risks in this regard go well beyond the concerns of corporate
risk minimisation. Indeed, the whole process of dealing with fracking’s waste water is a
highly risky business for local populations and the environment, with considerable risks of
water or soil contamination from surface leaks and spills.101 But perhaps the most con-
cerning issue with waste water is that it can contain signiﬁcant amounts of radioactive
material102 due to the ‘naturally occurring hypersaline brines associated with the for-
mations targeted for natural gas production’.103 For instance, radium has been found to
be building up in rivers downstream of shale gas waste discharge points in Pennsylva-
nia,104 while a company has been ﬁned for contaminating an aquifer with CBM
(termed coal seam gas (CSG) in Australia) waste containing uranium in New South
Wales, Australia.105
Summarising much of the data, a recent landmark US study by Vengosh et al. argues
that the overall risks posed by fracking development for water are fourfold (a similar,
though subtly different list could be produced for CBM106 extraction)107:
. Contamination of shallow aquifers in areas adjacent to shale gas development
through stray gas leaking from improperly constructed or failing gas wells.
. Contamination of water resources in areas of shale gas development and/or waste
management by spills, leaks or disposal of hydraulic fracturing ﬂuids and inade-
quately treated wastewaters.
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. Accumulation of metals and radioactive elements on stream, river and lake sediments
in wastewater disposal or spill sites, posing an additional long-term impact by slowly
releasing toxic elements and radiation to the environment in the impacted areas.
. Reduction of water supply through withdrawals of valuable fresh water from dry
areas and overexploitation of limited or diminished water resources for shale gas
development.
The human right to water was ﬁrst recognised within the UN system by the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights through their 2002 General Comment 15, which
located it implicitly in the rights to an adequate standard of living and to the highest attain-
able standard of health set out in Articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Econ-
omic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), respectively. In 2005, the Special Rapporteur
of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights issued draft
guidelines for a resolution on the right to drinking water and sanitation,108 which were
adopted by the Sub-Commission in 2006 as the Guidelines for the Realization of the
Right to Drinking Water and Sanitation. The HRC followed the guidelines with a request
for the High Commissioner for Human Rights to study the scope and content of human
rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation under current inter-
national human rights instruments.109 The results of the study were presented to the HRC in
2007 and included the High Commissioner’s recommendation that ‘ … it is now time to
consider access to safe drinking water and sanitation as a human right’.110 An independent
expert on the issue of human rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and
sanitation was established by the HRC in 2008, and in July 2010 the UN General Assembly
adopted resolution 64/292 recognising the ‘right to safe and clean drinking water and sani-
tation as a human right this is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human
rights’.111 In March 2011 the independent expert’s mandate was extended and the title
altered to Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and
Sanitation.112
Though the right to clean drinking water and sanitation has now been afﬁrmed by the
General Assembly and the HRC,113 there is no explicit international instrument on the right.
Rather, the HRC has deﬁned the human right to water and sanitation to derive from the right
to an adequate standard of living and found it inextricably related to the rights to health, life
and human dignity. Additionally, numerous international instruments include the right to
water and sanitation. The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW)114 is the earliest such example, stating the right of women to water
and sanitation as elements of the right to adequate living conditions. Subsequently, Inter-
national Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 161 of 1985115 referred to the right of
workers to sanitary installations, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
stated the right of children to clean drinking water,116 both the 1990 African Charter on
the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) on the Rights of Women in Africa117 include the rights to
safe drinking water, and, most recently, the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (CRPD) includes the rights to clean water services as a subset of the
right to social protection.118
With such evidence of wide international acceptance of the human right to water and
sanitation, and considering the place of this right within the context of a ‘minimally
good life’, it is thus appropriate to consider access to clean water and sanitation a fundamen-
tal human right and necessary to consider the impact of the fracking industry on that right.
Despite its widespread use in the US for over a decade, hydraulic fracturing has only
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recently been scrutinised to determine if and what its effects are on human rights. Under the
special procedures of the HRC, the Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drink-
ing Water and Sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque, concluded her 2011 mission to the US
by outlining serious concerns over the effect of a range of polluting activities associated
with the hydraulic fracturing process, observing a distinct: ‘policy disconnect… between
polluting activities and their ultimate impact on the safety of drinking water sources. The
absence of integrated thinking has generated enormous burdens, including increased
costs to public water systems to monitor and treat water to remove regulated contaminants
and detrimental health outcomes for individuals and communities.’119 While a comprehen-
sive report on the effects of hydraulic fracturing on water quality is expected from the US
Environmental Protection Agency late 2015,120 there have recently been other, smaller-
scale studies revealing water contamination due to fracking processes. Ingraffea et al.’s
review of compliance reports from conventional and unconventional oil and gas wells
drilled in Pennsylvania between 2000 and 2012121 reveals that casing/cement impairment
is six times more likely to occur in shale gas wells than in conventional wells. Such ﬂaws
may result in cases of subsurface gas migration into the water supply, as has already
occurred in the state. Indeed, published data demonstrate evidence of ‘contamination of
shallow aquifers with hydrocarbon gases… contamination of surface water and shallow
groundwater from spills, leaks, and/or the disposal of inadequately treated shale gas waste-
water… [and] accumulation of toxic and radioactive elements in soil or stream sediments
near disposal or spill sites…’ from hydraulic fracturing throughout the US.122 Qualitative
data from Colorado have further revealed complaints of water contamination from residents
living near fracking sites that are often intentionally misunderstood, assigned a different
cause, or diluted by state regulatory bodies.123 Recently the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection disclosed details of 243 cases in which fracking companies
were found by state regulators to have contaminated private drinking water wells in the
last four years.124 Cumulatively, these reports indicate likely impairment of the right to
water for residents living near fracking sites.
Air
A major, and often under-appreciated, impact of fracking is air pollution. Despite water
issues gaining the majority of press and public attention, it is becoming clear that for
most people reporting health problems associated with fracking, air pollution is far more
likely to be the initial cause.125 This is because air pollution will be present as soon as dril-
ling begins and it is much harder to avoid exposure to it. In comparison, the effects of water
pollution take much longer to emerge and it can take years for well casings to degrade
causing the wells to leak. Also, in the West at least, using alternative sources once a
problem is spotted can mitigate water contamination issues. A particularly serious air pol-
lutant produced by fracking is ozone, a powerful lung irritant that contributes to asthma and
other breathing disorders, and which can form as a result of reactions between leaking
methane and nitrogen oxides emitted from exhausts of diesel-powered equipment. Areas
with previous pristine air such as the Upper Green River Basin in Wyoming are now
seeing ozone levels spiking higher than those seen in Los Angeles, with people complaining
of watery eyes, shortness of breath and bloody noses.126 Ground-level ozone is a com-
ponent of smog and a costly, high-priority public health risk. Ozone exposure can cause
irreversible damage to the lungs and signiﬁcantly increase the chance of premature death.
In addition, numerous other chemicals present in natural gas at the well-head (including
hydrogen sulphide, benzene127 and other volatile hydrocarbons) can adversely, and
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seriously, affect air quality. Moreover, we need to consider the whole unconventional gas
extraction and production process when considering the effects of such developments. In
terms of impacts on localised air quality, emissions from trucks, compressors, pumps and
other equipment used in the drilling and production process contain a complex mixture
of benzene, toluene and xylene as well as other volatile organic compounds (VOCs).128
Dust levels must also be considered: drilling activities and associated site trafﬁc generate
signiﬁcant levels of dust while the small particle-size silica sand used in hydraulic fracturing
can cause silicosis, an incurable lung disease, and increases the risk of lung cancer.129
Fracking operations release VOCs ‘at each stage of production and delivery’130 and
while ozone is usually associated with automobile exhaust emissions, fracking generates
it when VOCs in wastewater ‘ponds’ evaporate and come into contact with well site
vehicle and generator diesel fumes.131 VOCs and ozone pollution have been detected at
dangerous levels at fracking sites in the US across Colorado, Wyoming and Utah.
Indeed, a major study in North-Eastern Colorado132 found exceptionally high levels of
VOCs in the air and traced the chemical signature of around 55% of them directly back
to gas and oil operations. Over signiﬁcant periods in 2011, the level of ozone pollution
in rural Wyoming’s gas drilling areas exceeded that of Los Angeles and other major
cities, and with an upper limit of 116 parts per billion, exceeded the US Environment Pro-
tection Agency’s healthy limit of 75 parts per billion.133 Uintah County, Utah, an area with
some of the highest-producing oil and gas ﬁelds in the country, has experienced danger-
ously high levels of VOCs and resultant ozone for over ﬁve years: the amount of VOCs
released in 2013 in Uintah County alone was calculated as the equivalent of emissions
from 100 million automobiles.134
A University of Colorado Denver, School of Public Health study documented danger-
ous airborne levels of benzene135 – known to cause multiple forms of leukaemia and other
blood disorders – near hydraulic fracturing operations.136 The study found elevated risks of
cancer for residents within half a mile of a drilling site. In another study focussing on North-
ern Texas,137 ambient air testing near gas drilling operations found excessive amounts of
many toxic chemicals, including benzene and carbon disulphide, an extremely high-risk
pollutant, possessing what the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality called ‘disas-
ter potential’.138 These chemicals were traced back to the drilling operations, as the testing
location had ‘virtually no heavy industry other than the [natural gas] compression
stations’.’139 Another report identiﬁed signiﬁcant amounts of over 40 health-harming
chemicals in the air near drilling sites in Colorado and although none were detected at
levels above United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) limits, that study
and others have noted that the EPA’s ambient air quality standards may not be strict
enough.140 Health standards often do not fully account for long-term health effects of
chemicals and enhanced risks to vulnerable populations141 such as pregnant women,
young children and the elderly.142
A University at Albany Institute for Health and the Environment study143 recently ident-
iﬁed eight highly toxic chemicals in air samples collected near fracking and associated infra-
structure sites across ﬁve states: Arkansas, Colorado, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Wyoming.
Chemicals detected included two benzene and formaldehyde (proven human carcinogens)
and hexane and hydrogen sulﬁde (two potent neurotoxins). The study found that for 29
out of 76 samples, concentrations far exceeded federal health and safety standards, in
some cases by several orders of magnitude. Moreover, in some instances highly elevated
levels of formaldehyde were found up to half a mile from a wellhead. Indeed, in Arkansas,
seven air samples contained formaldehyde at levels up to 60 times the level known to raise
the risk for cancer.144 According to the study’s lead author ‘this is a signiﬁcant public health
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risk… Cancer has a long latency, so you’re not seeing an elevation in cancer in these com-
munities. But ﬁve, 10, 15 years from now, elevation in cancer is almost certain to happen.’145
When considering the fundamental right to clean air (minimally, air that is free from
harmful levels of pollution), as a necessary aspect of the ‘minimally good life’, it is necess-
ary to ﬁrst note that access to air – like water – ‘was an entitlement so natural and funda-
mental that it was probably inconceivable that the continued availability of this access had
to be guaranteed as a human right’.146 Accordingly, an explicit right to air is not found in
any UN human rights instruments or special procedure. Despite this apparent international
inattention to the right to clean air, numerous national and regional bodies have recognised
the positive obligation of governments to ensure clean air for their populace, either as a
component of other internationally recognised rights or as an aspect of the right to a
healthy environment.
At the national level, the obligation of the state to protect its people from detrimental
pollution has been afﬁrmed in countries across the world. Some of the most explicit refer-
ences to air pollution have come from Asia, as the Supreme Court of India, in Subhash
Kumar v. State of Bihar (1991), stated that the right to life includes the right to pol-
lution-free water and air.147 Additionally, the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia, a
national human rights institution established by the Malaysian Parliament in 1999, has
asserted that the right to liberty within the Malaysian Constitution obliges the government
to provide clean air, based on their analysis of Malaysian national and case law.148 More
generally, environmental rights, as such, are recognised in 92 state constitutions, spanning
every continent, from Portugal to Mexico to Indonesia, Brazil to Madagascar to Russia.149
Even with such limited examples of a state-recognised right to clean air speciﬁcally, this
conglomeration of national acknowledgement of the right to a clean environment demon-
strates that the human right to air is broadly recognised, despite the absence of a UN
mechanism.
Examining regional human rights law further reveals the general acceptance of a right to
clean air, in so far as it is consistent with a general right to a healthy environment. Article 24
of the ACHPR expressly states the right of ‘[a]ll peoples… to a general satisfactory
environment favourable to their development’.150 In the Americas, the Additional Protocol
to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights afﬁrms in Article 11 that ‘[e]veryone shall have the right to live in a healthy
environment’, and that it is the state’s obligation to ‘promote the protection, preservation,
and improvement of the environment’.151 Within Europe, the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) ruled that air pollution speciﬁcally could be a violation of the right to
respect for home and private and family life in Lopez Ostra v. Spain (1994).152 The
court has also found that denying access to fresh air contributes to degrading and inhumane
treatment.153 In the case of Öneryildiz v. Turkey (2004), the ECtHR ruled that the govern-
ment has a duty to protect private property from environmental risks, as an element of the
right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions.154 Thus, evidence within each of the three
most prominent regional human rights legal systems suggests that there exists a general
right to a healthy environment – which must arguably include the right to clean air.
Finally, while the UN system has not recognised the right to clean air as it has the right
to water, connections between human rights and a healthy environment have recently been
enhanced at the global level. The introduction of an independent expert on human rights
and the environment in 2012 demonstrates the growing acceptance that ‘[a] safe, clean,
healthy and sustainable environment is integral to the full enjoyment of a wide range of
human rights, including the rights to life, health, food, water and sanitation’.155 More
recently, the HRC has recognised that ‘environmental damage has negative implications
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… for the effective enjoyment of human rights, in particular of the right to life, the right to
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, [and] the
right to an adequate standard of living and its components…’156 On air quality speciﬁcally,
the NGO Subcommittee on Poverty Eradication submitted, in a report to the UN Human
Rights Council, that there exists an inherent right to clean air that should be universally
enjoyed as a component of the right to ‘life-sustaining natural resources’.157 As of 2012,
177 UN member states recognise the right to a healthy environment either ‘through their
constitution, environmental legislation, court decisions, or ratiﬁcation of an international
agreement…’158 Whether or not the right to clean air is explicitly stated, it is vital to a
healthy environment, the rights to life and health (discussed below) and many others, in
short it is vital to the minimally good life. Thus, the current and potential effects of fracking
upon air quality represent not just an environmental threat, but also a threat to the enjoyment
of human rights.
Land
Fracking production has a considerable visual and physical impact on local landscapes.
Indeed, fracking involves cluster well-pads, compressor stations, new site access roads,
waste water containers/ponds and high-volume site trafﬁc. Industry and government
denials aside, the empirical reality of fracking developments is a considerable industrialis-
ation of rural areas.159 Land can also be impacted through water, air or soil pollution as we
have seen above, along with damage to livestock, vegetation and wildlife160 and damage
associated with fracking-induced seismic activity.161 While earthquakes may not be very
serious for local properties, although some have certainly been damaged, they can
damage the cement well casing, increasing the likelihood of what the industry calls
‘zonal isolation failure’ – in other words well casing failure – as happened already at the
exploration stage in the UK at Cuadrilla’s Presse Hall test site in Lancashire162 – and
which could result in methane leaks and groundwater contamination.
Colorado has seen signiﬁcant direct and indirect effects on wildlife, including popu-
lation declines and direct mortality, in gas development areas and recent discoveries of
new oil reserves and changing industry technology have dramatically altered the course
of development as well as the landscape of the state.163 In the mountainous regions of
the Marcellus shale region fracking drilling leads to soil ground erosion, and loosened sedi-
ments quickly enter surface streams, contaminating cold-water ﬁsh habitats and drinking
water sources.164 Even so, beyond these issues, perhaps the impact that will draw the
most attention from local residents is the likely impact on local property values. As US
researcher Richard Heinberg writes ‘the various forms of land damage from fracking
often result in decreased property values, making resale and farming difﬁcult, and also
making it harder to acquire mortgages and insurance. Properties adjoining drilling sites
are often simply unsellable, as no one wants to live with the noise, the bad air, and the possi-
bility of water pollution.’165
These impacts will of course multiply with each new development instigated in
response to the short production cycle of the average fracking cluster. Indeed, fracking
requires ‘heroic rates’166 of drilling to maintain production levels, and therefore enormous
numbers of drilling sites. Fracking also impacts land far from drilling sites as it requires key
material inputs such as sand – which itself needs to be mined and is used as a proppant (to
hold hydraulic-induced fractures open).167 For example, fracking in Pennsylvania, Texas
and North Dakota uses sand mined inWisconsin, Minnesota and Iowa, which itself destroys
farmland, impacts wildlife and degrades waterways, while tiny silica particles dislodged by
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mining, when taken up by winds, can result in higher rates of silicosis and cancer in local
populations.168
In this context, the right to land can be viewed as the right to land free from severe eco-
logical destruction and its negative effects upon human health and property values. This
right, as a human right threatened by fracking, is comprised of the rights to respect for
privacy, the family, and home, and protection of property – both of which have been
legally established in numerous national, regional and international legal instruments.
The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) includes the
right not to be ‘subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference’ to one’s ‘privacy, family,
home or correspondence’.169 This right is also found in the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR),170 the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR),171 and
the Arab Charter on Human Rights.172 Within the European context especially, this right
to privacy, family and home has been used in cases of environmental degradation before
the ECtHR. Although in most cases – relevant to the discussion of fracking’s impact on
the land – the court found no violation of this right, it did assert that violation was possible
due to environmental destruction that directly affects human well-being (Kyrtatos v.Greece
(2003)),173 damage to a home by nearby industry (Dubetska and Others v. Ukraine
(2011)),174 or excessive levels of noise and dust (Martinez Martinez and María Pino
Manzano v. Spain (2012)).175 Such ﬁndings are largely related to the right to protection
of property, found in the Protocol to the ECHR,176 the ACHR,177 the ACHPR,178 the
Arab Charter on Human Rights,179 in addition to numerous national constitutions.180
The ECtHR case of Flamenbaum and Others v. France (2012)181 highlights the connection
between these two rights as the court asserted that a drop in the market value of property,
due to industry activities that could violate the right to privacy, the family and home, would
be a violation of the right to protection of property.182 Therefore, when the rights to privacy,
family, home and protection of property are read to include protection from pollution,
environmental harm that affects human well-being, and damage to the home – including
protection from arbitrary property devaluation due to nearby industrial activities – it is
apparent that the effects of fracking on the land are capable of legally violating human
rights.
Health
While scientiﬁc studies on the health impacts of fracking are still in their relative infancy,
partially due to the time lag between environmental impacts and provable human health
consequences, there is an emerging body of literature and growing awareness of recurring
health defects found in residents living near fracking sites.183 The recently publicised Texas
lawsuit by Robert and Lisa Parr against Aruba Petroleum, in which a jury awarded the
family $3 million, was based on the health effects they experienced following the arrival
of fracking to their community. The Parrs complained of nosebleeds, vision problems,
nausea, rashes and blood pressure issues184 – symptoms similar to those which have
been reported near drilling sites in Colorado,185 Pennsylvania186 and other unconventional
natural gas operations.187
Recent reports have also noted connections between maternal proximity to unconven-
tional drilling sites and birth defects, including congenital heart defects, neural tube defects
and low birth-rates, though these studies again lack the robust and comprehensive nature
required to ﬁnd a causal link between fracking-related pollution and health impairments.188
Despite this, the quantity of studies showing correlations between fracking and health pro-
blems is rising fast, with people living near fracking wells in Pennsylvania more than twice
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as likely to report upper-respiratory and skin problems.189 Serious ailments have been
reported by families living in close proximity to drilling operations of the Eagle Ford
Shale in South Texas,190 and increases in coughs, chest tightness, rashes, difﬁculty sleeping,
joint pains, muscle pains and spasms, nausea and vomiting, spontaneous nose bleeds and
skin irritations have been observed among residents living near CBM wells in Tara,
Queensland.191
These reports are also deeply concerning for people living in countries at the explora-
tion stage, especially where the authorities mean to protect public health in the development
process but fail to take on board the latest peer-reviewed health studies. Indeed, for those
UK residents living near proposed fracking sites, such as Preston New Road and Roseacre
in Lancashire, Public Health England’s (PHE) 25 June 2014 report was so inadequate in its
coverage that there is some suggestion that it amounted to ‘gross scientiﬁc misconduct’.192
A robust interdisciplinary human rights-based investigation seeking health indicator data
would go well beyond PHE’s meagre review of just 25 publications,193 up until their arbi-
trary cut-off date of December 2012, as there have been over 90 relevant reports published
since. Many of these reports were considered in the New York State Department of Health’s
far more comprehensive report, which was instrumental in New York State recently issuing
a moratorium on all fracking development on the basis that the public health risks were too
great.194
The various aspects of fracking’s ecological footprint holistically demonstrate the
potential for environmental rights violations to reach a severity capable of abusing the
human rights to health and life. These rights, enshrined in numerous national and inter-
national instruments, including the International Bill of Rights, have been deﬁned
broadly by the UN and other bodies to include rights related to ecological preservation.195
The right to health is ‘an inclusive right’, comprising not only the right of access to health
care but also the right to reasonable protection from detriments to health, such as ‘access to
safe and potable water and adequate sanitation’ (see above) and to a healthy natural
environment.196 The right to life is, of course, intrinsically linked to the right to health,
as human life may be endangered by environmental degradation severe enough to
damage human health.197 The European Court of Human Rights has, for instance, ruled
that a state may violate right to life by not informing residents of nearby potential environ-
mental safety risks or by failing to enact practical measures to avoid those safety risks.198
In the following section we discuss the currently under-researched civil and political
dimensions of proposed fracking development in a key emerging context: the UK’s
‘second dash for gas’.199 The research sought to explore ofﬁcial responses to anti-fracking
protests in the UK, with speciﬁc reference to the police response to anti-fracking protests.
The discussion refers to civil and political rights that are all recognised in the UK’s 1998
Human Rights Act (HRA), the ECHR and the ICCPR. These encompass the right to
freedom of peaceful assembly, the right to freedom of expression, the right to liberty and
security of the person, the right to a fair trial, and the right to respect for a private and
family life. All of the rights discussed stem from the context of protest as a response to
the proposed introduction of fracking in the UK, and are supported by primary research
gathered through an online survey and interviews.
Freedom of peaceful assembly
Our UK-based primary research focussed on two exploratory (potential fracking) sites and
their targeted protests: Balcombe in West Sussex200 and Barton Moss in Salford.201 Conﬂict
arose at both of these locations due to the responses of Sussex Police and Greater
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Manchester Police (GMP), respectively, to these peaceful protests, conducted most com-
monly by protesters attempting to delay the delivery of equipment or chemicals by
walking in front of the lorries delivering these items to the drilling site. The results of
these actions by the police have been threats to, and arguable violations of, civil and pol-
itical rights recognised in the HRA, ECHR and ICCPR. The right to peaceful assembly
is articulated in Article 11 of both the HRA202 and the ECHR,203 and Article 21 of the
ICCPR.204 All of these articles place restrictions upon how the right to freedom of peaceful
assembly can be expressed, which are of immediate relevance to this discussion, seeking as
they do to balance the right of the individual citizen with the legal powers of the state. In the
context of this discussion, as a protest is an assembly, any action which prevents individuals
from peacefully protesting is a violation of the right to peaceful assembly.
Article 11(2) of both the HRA and the ECHR detail how the only restrictions placed
upon the freedom of peaceful assembly should be those ‘prescribed by law’, and are
required ‘in the interests of national security or public safety’ or ‘for the prevention of dis-
order or crime’. In addition, Article 11(2) in both the HRA and ECHR also states that ‘[t]his
Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights
by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State’. Article
21 of the ICCPR gives less detail as to how the right to peaceful assembly should be con-
trolled by the state, as it does not reference armed forces, police or state administration. The
right to freedom of peaceful assembly in the ICCPR is therefore less restrictive than the
expression of the same right in the HRA of the UK, drafted over three decades later.
The online survey gave valuable insight into the general experience of anti-fracking
protestors, at least as far as can be gauged from a selective form of research. Of the 168
respondents, 98 had personal experience of direct action against fracking in the UK. Of
that 98, 79 had either interacted with the police or witnessed interactions between the
police and other protesters during that experience. Of those interactions, 56 (over 76%)
experienced or witnessed excessive use of force by members of the police, 64 (over
87%) experienced or witnessed unnecessary use of force by members of the police, and
61 (over 83%) experienced or witnessed unnecessary arrests. These ﬁgures provide, mini-
mally, a generalisation of how the police responded to anti-fracking protests in the UK.
The overwhelming majority of both survey and interview respondents believed their
right to freedom of peaceful assembly was prevented from being realised by the actions
of police ofﬁcers. The majority of comments below therefore illustrate the ways in
which police failed to facilitate the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, as expressed
in peaceful protest. This failure mostly involved the use of violence to inhibit individuals’
ability to peacefully protest, but also extended to the removal of individuals from the protest
site (without arrests being made) and unlawful arrests. Most interview respondents made
reference to the fact that police were not facilitating any form of peaceful protest. With
reference to Barton Moss, one respondent described how ‘in terms of actual policing
[… ] It was very difﬁcult to run a campaign’, due to GMP’s control over the protestors’
actions.205 Another respondent described how they were removed from the Barton Moss
protest by two police ofﬁcers who ‘were interfering with my right to protest’ as ‘they did
stop me from actually demonstrating’,206 illuminating the extent to which police were
capable of forcibly preventing peaceful protest without making arrests. With regard to
lorries, around which most protest activity revolved, one respondent described how
police tactics changed between Balcombe, where one lorry was escorted at a time by the
police, and Barton Moss: ‘When we went to Barton Moss they decided to use the
convoy system, bringing in anywhere between ten and ﬁfteen trucks at a time [… ] that
way they undermined our ability to slow the process down.’207
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The change between Balcombe and Barton Moss was suggested as police altering their
response to anti-fracking protest ‘in light of what they learnt at Balcombe’.208 Aside from
the changes to the escorting of lorries, a consistently referenced constant between the two
protests was the use of violence by members of the police to prevent the realisation of the
right to freedom of peaceful assembly through protest. In interactions with the police at both
Balcombe and Barton Moss, interview respondents described how they were ‘kicked and
pushed and punched’,209 ‘pushed and shoved in the back’,210 ‘pushed off the road by the
police’,211 and ‘shoved in the back repeatedly’.212 Police interactions were described as
‘rough’,213 ‘ultra aggressive’,214 and ‘very, very aggressive’,215 resulting in interactions
in which ‘bones got broken’.216 The interactions of police with other protestors was
described as ‘shoving people, pushing people, trying to knock people over, trying to get
people on the ground’,217 ‘kicking their ankles’,218 and ‘deliberately kicking up the
backs of legs’.219 These data, gathered from interviews and alluded to in the experiences
of survey respondents, indicate the primary method by which GMP and Sussex Police pre-
vented the realisation of peaceful protest, supplemented by unlawful arrests, and is a far cry
from police claims of acting ‘professionally and fairly’.220
Further to police interference, indications of county council involvement in the control-
ling and dismantling of protests have appeared. The West Sussex County Council obtained
a possession order for land where Balcombe protesters were camped, forcing them to relo-
cate. Though the council provided a new area for the protest, it forbade camping on the site
due to the safety risk posed by a nearby unlit road.221 The Salford City Council, covering
the Barton Moss site, has been shown to meet regularly with the GMP and IGas during anti-
fracking protests, sharing information and intelligence and discussing levels of acceptable
police force. This is in contrast to the council’s level of cooperation with protesters, as
reportedly none of the councillors visited the protest site.222 To be sure, there have been
signiﬁcant issues with suppression of anti-fracking protests outside the UK. The fracking
industry and governments in the US, Canada and Australia appear to often consider resist-
ance by local people to be an ‘insurgency’, and anti-fracking groups, particularly in poorer
or maginalised communities (HRIAs would need to disaggregate data in this regard), are
routinely labelled as terrorists,223 subjected to psychological warfare operations,224 intimi-
dation225 and police violence.226
Freedom of expression
The right to freedom of expression is detailed in Article 10 of both the HRA227 and
ECHR228 and Article 19 of the ICCPR.229 This freedom is understood in Article 10(1)
of the HRA and the ECHR as the ‘freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart infor-
mation and ideas without interference by public authority’, and in Article 19(2) of the
ICCPR as the ‘freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds
[… ] either, orally, in writing or in print’. With relevance to the preceding discussion on
the right to peaceful assembly, this freedom can be expressed in the form of protest.230
Although every instance in which police responses have restricted the right to peaceful
assembly could also be discussed here, it will sufﬁce to say that any unlawful restriction
of protest through ‘interference by public authority’ can be considered a violation of the
right to freedom of expression.
In addition, as indicated by the human rights legislation, the right to freedom of
expression is concerned more generally with the imparting of information or ideas. One
interview respondent made reference to banners outside the homes of residents on
Barton Moss Lane, who lived in proximity to both the Barton Moss protestors’ camp
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and IGas’ exploratory drilling site. The interview respondent explained how the occupants
of the buildings had made banners saying ‘No shale’ and ‘No methane gas mining here’.231
These banners, although located on the private property of the residents, had prompted
GMP to visit and request that the banners be removed – seemingly in contravention of
the right to freedom of expression. As with police response to protest, the interference
by public authority is explicit here: GMP’s actions interfered with the ability of the residents
to ‘hold opinions’ and ‘impart information and ideas’ through the medium of anti-fracking
banners. If this request did not violate the right of the residents to freedom of expression
then reference must be found within the domestic and international legislation for legitimate
interference by public authority.
The HRA, ECHR and ICCPR all contain details as to how and why the right to freedom
of expression may be curtailed by the representatives of the state. Article 10(2) of both the
HRA and the ECHR state that this right ‘may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law’, which are clariﬁed as ‘the interests of
national security’ and ‘the prevention of disorder or crime’. Similarly, Article 19(3) of
the ICCPR states that the right to freedom of expression ‘may [… ] be subject to certain
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law’, which are, in Article
19(3), described as being ‘For the protection of national security or of public order’. For
the request by GMP not to have violated the residents’ right to freedom of expression,
the presence of the banners must be considered a threat to national security or public
order, or their removal must be considered necessary to prevent crime. These three scen-
arios appear to be legally unfounded, unless the anti-fracking movement itself is considered
a threat to ‘national security’. The banners may have encouraged activity at the Barton Moss
protest camp, but that would only prompt legal justiﬁcation for their removal if said activity
was considered to be a threat to public order, or to constitute a crime. As the majority of
protest activity fell within the remit of the right to peaceful assembly, such claims would
appear to be legally unfounded, rendering GMP’s request unlawful.
Liberty and security of person
The right to liberty and security of person is articulated in Article 5 of both the HRA232 and
ECHR,233 and Article 9 of the ICCPR.234 This right is of relevance to the context of UK
anti-fracking protests due to the arrests made by GMP and Sussex Police, which are
required by domestic and international legislation to be lawful in order to not violate this
particular right. Indeed, Article 5(1)(c) of both the HRA and the ECHR require ‘lawful
arrest [… ] on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence’, and Article 9(1) of
the ICCPR states that ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.’ In
addition, Article 5(2) of both the HRA and the ECHR states that ‘Everyone who is arrested
shall be informed promptly [… ] of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against
him’, and Article 9(2) of the ICCPR states that ‘[a]nyone who is arrested shall be informed,
at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any
charges against him’. Any arrest made which could be deemed unlawful under the above
descriptions would therefore violate the right of the individual arrested to liberty and secur-
ity of person.
First, references were made in several interviews to the concept of arrest quotas,
whereby police would carry out speciﬁc numbers of arrests over consecutive days. At
Barton Moss, throughout the autumn and winter of 2013, one interview respondent recalled
how ‘there were ﬁve arrests every day’, and that ‘ofﬁcers were heard to say “We need one
more arrest.”’235 There was a belief that the use of arrest quotas was ‘almost certainly
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planned in advance’, and designed as ‘a long term plan’ which would ensure that ‘even-
tually everyone would be arrested’.236 More explicitly, patterns of arrest seemed to
follow this trajectory: ‘you’re arrested, you get bailed, next time you get arrested in
breach of bail’.237 Over a period of time, such a cycle would decrease the effectiveness
of the protest camp’s actions and increase the likelihood of its disbandment.
In addition to arrest quotas,238 interview respondents referenced the use of arbitrary
arrests in both Balcombe and Barton Moss, whereby individuals felt arrests had no legal
basis and were used as a way of ‘undermining people’s morale’ because ‘it puts people
off protesting’.239 Arrests were described variously as ‘clearly random’,240 ‘quite
random’241 and ‘completely random’,242 with one respondent expressing the most telling
sentiment, that: ‘there was a risk that at any time you could be arrested’.243 Such arrests,
made without legal basis, would be in direct contravention of the right to liberty and secur-
ity of person. The prevalence of violations is best indicated by the discrepancy between the
numbers of arrests of anti-fracking protestors in Balcombe, 126 in total, with those who
have been found guilty and sentenced in court, a mere 14.244 In addition to quotas and arbi-
trary arrests, allegations were made during an interview of arrests being knowingly made on
unlawful charges by GMP. At Barton Moss, the lorries travelled down Barton Moss Lane to
reach the IGas drilling site, a designated private road with footpath access for the public,
which is, according to an interview respondent who resides in the area, ‘clearly signposted
at the top’.245 The same respondent described how police made arrests on Barton Moss
Lane for ‘the crime of obstructing a public highway’, which is an entirely unlawful
charge given that the road is private with public footpath access, and therefore does not con-
stitute a public highway.246 Furthermore, the respondent described how, at a court hearing
of individuals charged with this crime in November 2013, ‘a solicitor informed the court
that Barton Moss Lane was a private road which has public footpath access’.247
However, the respondent states that GMP ‘continued to make arrests under that crime
until [… ] February’, meaning that, ‘for nearly three months they continued to arrest for
a crime that wasn’t a crime’.248
Thus in this example, both the initial and later arrests are therefore unlawful, causing
violations of the right to liberty and security of person through failing to comply with
basic requirements of lawful detention. As an additional requirement of making lawful
arrests, police ofﬁcers must, as indicated above, inform individuals of the charges under
which they are being arrested. One interview respondent described how, at Barton Moss
‘[… ] when people were arrested, if they were told anything, it was when they were sep-
arated from the walk [… ] once they were actually in the police van they might be told
what they were being arrested for’.249 Another respondent stated, also with reference to
Barton Moss and the GMP, ‘the police have been acting illegally at various times and
they’ve been impeding the legal right to protest’, with speciﬁc reference here to unlawful
arrests.250 Such testimony suggests that the GMP’s actions were designed to disrupt the
anti-fracking protestors’ right to freedom of peaceful assembly, apparently through unlaw-
ful activity.
Fair trial
The right to a fair trial is articulated in Article 6 of the HRA251 and ECHR252 and Article 14
of the ICCPR.253 Article 6(3) of the HRA and ECHR detail the ‘minimum rights’ which an
individual charged with a criminal offence is entitled to, and Article (14)(3) of the ICCPR is
similarly concerned with such ‘minimum guarantees’. Under these provisions an individual
must ‘be informed promptly [… ] and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation
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against him’. Consequently, any instance in which an anti-fracking protestor is arrested and
not informed ‘promptly’ of the charges or suspicion under which he or she is being charged,
would contravene the right to a fair trial in the HRA, ECHR and ICCPR. As we outlined
earlier, such circumstances have been experienced at Barton Moss protests.
The arrest of protestors on Barton Moss Lane for the crime of obstructing a public
highway also concerns the right to a fair trial through connections with the provision of
legal aid. As discussed above, protestors were unlawfully arrested in 2013 and early
2014 for obstructing a public highway whilst walking in front of lorries on Barton Moss
Lane. An interview respondent involved with the Barton Moss protests described how indi-
viduals ‘can’t claim legal aid for an offence of obstruction of a public highway under the
current rules’,254 and expressed concern that GMP’s continued arrest of protestors under
this crime was a deliberate ploy to ensure protestors ‘wouldn’t be able to defend them-
selves’ ﬁnancially.255 In legislative terms, Article 6(3)(c) of the HRA and ECHR detail
the minimum right that any individual charged with an offence and without ﬁnancial pro-
vision for legal representation ‘be given it free when the interests of justice so require’, and
Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR similarly states that any such individual must ‘have legal
assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require’. By char-
ging protesters with a crime which legal aid was not provided for, GMP and, perhaps more
so – the Crown Prosecution Service, were knowingly prompting judicial proceedings in
which many protesters would be unable to meet the ﬁnancial costs of a court case. If pro-
testers had instead been arrested for crimes which did receive legal aid, and indeed were
actual crimes in this context, such a tactic would have no basis. Fortunately, pro bono
legal support was provided, or protesters would have been prevented from being able to
obtain legal representation against the charges they faced. In that scenario, given the unlaw-
ful nature of the initial arrest, the ‘interests of justice’ would have been seriously
compromised.
Respect for a private and family life
The right to a private and family life is articulated in Article 8 of both the HRA256 and the
ECHR,257 as ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence’, while Article 17(1) of the ICCPR states that ‘No one shall be subjected
to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.’ It is
the precise wording of these articles which allows for interpretations to be made as to how
this right has been threatened or violated in the context of anti-fracking protests, through
monitoring of communications and covert surveillance of protestors.
Several interview respondents raised concerns of police surveillance of email accounts,
telephones and social media. Although, as one interview respondent indicated, such activi-
ties are ‘difﬁcult to prove’,258 other interview respondents were insistent in their belief of
surveillance activity, stating that ‘We knew that they were monitoring our Facebook pages,
our emails and our phones’ at both Balcombe and Barton Moss,259 and ‘I have no doubt that
they were bugging certain people’s phones’ and ‘keeping a close eye on people’s Facebook
pages’ in Balcombe.260 Concerns for some anti-fracking protestors over the security of
information were such that one respondent described how, when important details about
protest action in Balcombe required discussion, the individuals involved would ‘get
together and speak about it rather than using [social] media’.261 Seemingly to conﬁrm
fears of surveillance, another respondent described how a list of press contacts on an
email account were ‘scrambled’,262 preventing messages from reaching the majority of
the list.
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In addition to covert surveillance through technology, members of the anti-fracking
movement have become increasingly concerned over police inﬁltration via social media
accounts or undercover individuals joining speciﬁc campaigns or protest camps. Indeed,
a request made as part of this primary research for online survey respondents was met
with the suggestion that the collation of such information was likely to be a database for
police use. Furthermore, one respondent believed that the police were providing drilling
companies with information gathered about protestors, stating that ‘We’d have to strongly
suspect [… ] that covert intelligence was shared between Greater Manchester Police and
iGas.’263 Such mistrust indicates signiﬁcant concerns surrounding the police, the internet
and conﬁdentiality. It also demonstrates why concerned individuals, as mentioned above,
prefer face-to-face conversations over online or telephone interactions.
In order for any surveillance of communications to be lawful, Article 8(1) of both the
HRA and ECHR require that any restrictions placed upon the right to respect for a private
and family life are ‘[… ] in accordance with the law and [are] necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime’. The use of covert surveillance by
either GMP or Sussex Police would indicate a belief that anti-fracking protesters threatened
‘national security’ or ‘public safety’, or increased the possibility of ‘disorder or crime’. As
mentioned previously with reference to the right to freedom of expression, given that the
majority of protest activity fell within the remit of the right to peaceful assembly, such
claims would appear to be without legal foundation.
In the UK, potential future rights concerns may well go beyond circumstances sur-
rounding speciﬁc protest sites if the behaviour of Kent police towards an open academic
debate is indicative of a national policing approach towards this issue. In November
2014 they asked a university to provide a list of members of the public who were due to
attend a public debate on fracking.264 From subsequent ‘freedom of information’ requests
it was revealed that if such a list were forthcoming Kent police would have conducted
‘some R&D’265 – presumably meaning the individuals would be researched somehow.
Such police behaviour should not be analysed as if it occurs in a vacuum. It is vital to con-
sider the broader political context and in particular the ‘political spectacle’266 that has been
constructed around fracking in the UK. On the surface it may seem that the extraction of
shale gas is considered necessary for ‘the economic well-being of the UK’ and hence ‘in
the national interest’, and is simply being prioritised over individuals’ fundamental civil
and political rights; but if we were to investigate a little deeper, a more politically concern-
ing picture may emerge, especially considering recent evidence likening the precarious
nature of the US ‘fracking boom’267 to that of a government supported ‘Ponzi scheme’.268
As Noam Chomsky warns, ‘the terms, United States, Australia, Britain, and so on, are
now conventionally used to refer to the structures of power within such countries: the
“national interest” is the interest of these groups, which correlates only weakly with the
interests of the general population’.269 A critical awareness of such observations is vital
to conducting nuanced interdisciplinary HRIAs in our view. Such assessments should, as
far as possible, investigate and analyse the ‘close relationship between governments and
powerful multinational corporations’, which de Rijke270 warned of with unconventional
gas production in the Australia, and its impact on policy and the subsequent policing of dis-
senting voices. For example, in the UK much of the public fracking debate has been con-
ducted in a context which involves a government wanting to ‘go all out for shale’ while at
the same time having a ‘lead non-executive director’ at the Cabinet Ofﬁce, Lord Browne,
who is also the Chairman of shale gas company Cuadrilla Resources. There have been illu-
minating ‘freedom of information’ requests in the UK that have demonstrated collusion
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between key politicians and industry ﬁgures on such matters as how best to ‘manage’ public
perceptions and manufacture consent in order to ‘fast track’ fracking development.271
Environmental consultant and extreme energy expert Paul Mobbs has highlighted numer-
ous political-industry connections that are deserving of public attention and which raise
fears of ‘malfeasance’ in public ofﬁce.272 Mobbs argues, ‘politicians might call for a
“balanced debate on shale”, but arguably it is they who are peddling a manufactured rheto-
ric.273 This is because the political process has been hijacked by lobbyists paid by the indus-
try, whose manipulative tendrils reach right inside the Government.’274
By drawing upon the experience of individuals in the UK, this discussion has sought to
expose the extent to which the civil and political rights of anti-fracking protestors and indi-
viduals living in proximity to exploratory drilling sites have been threatened or violated as a
result of the proposed introduction of fracking. The police response to anti-fracking pro-
tests, seemingly prompted by the need to protect governmental policy, has violated the
right to freedom of peaceful assembly itself, in addition to threatening and violating
other rights in the context of anti-fracking protests. Arguably then, the proposal of introdu-
cing fracking in the UK has already violated internationally and domestically recognised
rights, with actual implementation of this particular method of energy extraction expected
to only further impact human rights, of an economic, social and cultural nature as well as
civil and political.
Anthropogenic climate change
While issues such as industrialisation of the landscape, water, air, noise pollution and citi-
zens’ ability to participate and protest are all important issues to consider in human rights
impact assessments, perhaps the most important issue to consider is fracking’s impact on
greenhouse gas emissions and anthropogenic climate change. The latest climate science
suggests that we can only burn approximately one-third275 of known conventional
fossil fuel reserves if we are to avoid catastrophic, runaway climate change.276 Thus,
scientists such as James Hansen and Kevin Anderson argue that unconventional
sources such as shale gas need to be left in the ground. Indeed, taking recent climate
science seriously calls into question the whole idea of ‘unconventional’ extraction. If
we are to avoid runaway climate change and a potential extinction event for mankind,
then, as leading climate scientist James Hansen puts it, ‘we must rapidly phase out coal
emissions, leave unconventional fossil fuels in the ground, and not go after the last
drops of oil and gas. In other words, we must move as quickly as possible to the post-
fossil fuel era of clean energies.’277 Tyndall Centre climate scientist Kevin Anderson
concurs, ‘the only responsible action with regard to shale gas, or any ‘new’ unconven-
tional fossil fuel, is to keep it in the ground – at least until there is a meaningful
global emissions cap forcing substitution. In the absence of such an emissions cap, and
in our energy hungry world, shale gas will only be combusted in addition to coal – not
as a substitution, as many analysts have naively suggested.’278 Despite this, there is con-
siderable industry and government propaganda concerning the use of unconventional gas
as a so-called ‘bridge fuel’, a proposition which is highly dubious and likely false. Robert
Howarth’s recent paper ‘A Bridge to Nowhere: Methane Emissions and the Greenhouse
Gas Footprint of Natural Gas’ shows that over the crucial 20-year-period (in which we
need to drastically reduce emissions to avoid the worst of climate change), both shale
gas and conventional natural gas have a larger GHG footprint than do coal or oil,
largely due to fugitive methane emissions.
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While no explicit legal right to protection from climate change – or similar – exists, the
negative effect of climate change on the enjoyment of numerous human rights is well docu-
mented. A connection between climate change and human rights was ﬁrst drawn by the
Inuit Circumpolar Council in their 2005 petition to the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights Case against the US.279 The Inuit Council claimed that excessive green-
house gas emissions from the US violated their right to culture through advancing
climate change. While this case was dismissed by the Inter-American Commission as inad-
missible,280 it brought considerable attention to two important texts: the International
Council on Human Rights Policy report which highlighted the ‘human rights concerns
raised by anthropogenic climate changes’281 and Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23
which explicitly states ‘ … climate change poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to
people and communities around the world and has implications for the full enjoyment of
human rights’.282 An Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
study on climate change, called for in Resolution 7/23, was conducted later that same
year and not only elaborated on human rights violations due to climate change, but also
upon the legal mechanisms in human rights, environmental and other areas of law that
oblige states to address climate change and protect their denizens from its consequences.283
Following the study, in 2009 Human Rights Council Resolution 10/4 stated that climate
change is currently directly and indirectly negatively affecting human rights,284 a view
that was afﬁrmed by the Human Rights Council Panel Discussion on the relationship
between climate change and human rights later that year.285 A seminar convened by the
OHCHR in 2012 also found the same conclusion.286 Indeed, from the above discussions
of various human rights and their relationship to the environment, as well as the conse-
quences of climate change, the threat of climate change to the minimally good life is
immediately apparent, and, therefore, the right to live free from the negative effects of
climate change should be considered implicit within the human rights legal framework.
Thus, via its contribution to anthropogenic climate change we ﬁnd another possible
avenue through which fracking activities are capable of violating human rights.
Conclusion
The hegemonic neoliberal version of capitalism under which most of us now live has such a
signiﬁcant thirst for fossil fuels that their extraction tends to trump all other concerns. As
resources become scarcer and we scrape the bottom of the fossil fuel barrel through the use
of more energy intensive, higher risk and environmentally destructive extraction processes,
the relationship between resource development and human rights becomes ever more proble-
matic. Indeed, human rights violations due to climate change are but another side effect of
humanity’s dependence on fossil fuels that is growing in magnitude with each passing
decade. These violations are likely to increase and be felt more acutely as resources are
depleted, quite possibly until the sharp population decline predicted in The Limits to
Growth occurs. If there were not considerable evidence emerging, on an almost daily basis,
concerning the actual, and potential, impacts and dangers of fracking development in
countries with a mature industry such as the US, Canada and Australia,287 it is highly
likely that theUK’s anti-frackingmovementwould not be its fastest growing socialmovement
and the protests in which violations of civil and political rights have occurred may not have
taken place.As things stand, however, it seems that citizens’ civil and political rights are being
violated in defence of their environmental, economic, social and cultural rights.
This article has shown the extent to which the process and infrastructure of fracking
developments has the capacity to threaten and violate a wide range of internationally
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recognised human rights, including rights to water, air, land and health. Additionally, our
research suggests the rights to peaceful assembly, freedom of expression, liberty and secur-
ity of the person, fair trial and a private and family life have also been violated in the state
response to protests opposing fracking development. These rights encompass the principles
codiﬁed in international human rights legislation and the civil liberties recognised in many
state constitutions. It is only with more research into the actual impact of these energy tech-
nologies on human rights that violations can be identiﬁed and hopefully stopped and reme-
died. Importantly this research must be industry independent, and must do more than appear
on annual CSR statements. It should also be independent of government given the close
relationships between governments and extractive industries and the tendency of govern-
ment-sponsored reports to be suspiciously limited288 or to include dubious ‘REDACTED’
sections on public release.289 In sum, there is an urgent need for independent, comprehen-
sive, evidence-based interdisciplinary HRIAs to provide valuable impact data and analysis.
Such assessments will be a vital tool for communities in the defence of their rights when
faced with immanent extreme energy developments and governments intent on unsustain-
able fossil fuel extraction.
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